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Re-Bordering Spaces
Jouni Häkli
THE NATION-STATE AND THE LEGACY OF BORDER STUDIES
Borders and boundaries are everywhere. Individuals and human communities
define and structure the social world by making distinctions between groups,
spaces, times, objects and meanings. We encounter borders constantly in our
everyday lives, and know how to respect or transgress them by intuition,
experience or reasoning. Broadly speaking, borders and boundaries represent an
immense area of research including almost everything that pertains to humans and
societies.
 In the context of political geography, the topic is much more focused. The
sub-discipline’s tradition has typically approached borders through a geopolitical
prism, typically as part of nation-state territoriality, or as dividers between
geopolitical blocs. In retrospect the involvement of political geography with states
and their geopolitics may seem obvious. The twentieth century was characterized
by the rise into prominence of the nation-state as the most powerful political
organization defining the fate of individuals and communities. Rivalry between
states and the striving to establish new nation-states caused major international
conflicts throughout the century. To overcome the sources of such conflicts, states
have sought to create international mechanisms of political and economic
regulation, such as the United Nations, the European Union and the North
American Free Trade Area.
 The minds of practitioners of statecraft, as well as many intellectuals, were
preoccupied with questions of territoriality and borders. Among the most crucial
geopolitical questions of the twentieth century, linking power and space
intimately together, was that of the territorial congruence, or incongruence,
between national homelands and emerging state territories (Herb, 1997). The
geopolitical imagination of the classical thinkers, such as Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf
Kjellen and Sir Halford Mackinder, traced the sources of states’ geopolitical
power and hegemony (Ó Tuathail, 1996). While these voices were keenly heard at
the corridors of power, more radical, anti-statist strands of thought were presented
by anarchist thinkers, such as Elisée Reclus and Pyotr Kropotkin (Kramsch and
Hooper, 2004).
 The overwhelming majority of the early twentieth-century border studies
were firmly connected to a state-centred perspective on the geopolitical world.
The growing power of states as dominant political organizations had its
intellectual counterpart in what Peter Taylor (1996) has called the ‘embedded
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statism’ of social scientific research. With few exceptions, social science
disciplines operated on a concept of society that took nation-state territory for
granted in its definition. Hence, in empirical social research and even in
theoretical work, the borders of society equaled those of the respective nation-
state (Häkli, 2001).
 Little wonder, then, that international boundaries were not among the hotly
debated topics of early twentieth-century social theory. Even political geography
research of the time treated state borders mainly as an empirical issue. The
practical application of boundary studies may have reached its apex after the First
World War, when scholars were charged with demarcating the boundaries
between new countries in south-eastern Europe, according to the Wilsonian
principle of territorial self-determination (Anderson, 1996; Herb, 1997). Political
geographers undertook much of this work on boundaries, reflecting their interest
in the combination of physical and cultural features that boundaries represent.
Early examples are classic texts by Ellen Semple (1911) and Isaiah Bowman
(1922).
 Along more theoretical lines, some attempts were made to distinguish
between different kinds of borders, such as natural and artificial state boundaries.
Often the aim was simply to compare the demarcation of political lines to physical
features and then to the cultural landscape (Jones, 1959). Richard Hartshorne, for
example, classified boundaries by how well they corresponded to divisions of
peoples (Minghi, 1963). Although it would be unfair to say that boundaries were
always viewed simply as natural dividers between differing cultures, political
systems and economies, much of this early work took the existence of nation-
states for granted. In many cases, boundaries were viewed as ‘walls’ or ‘curtains’
that separated rival ideological systems of mutually hostile states (Kristof, 1959).
Hence, studies tended to emphasize stress and conflict involved, depicting the
boundary as a cause of friction between states (Minghi, 1991: 17).
 An  early  line  of  research  that  still  continues  today  are  studies  that  take  a
functionalist view of borders. Here the degree of interaction across boundaries,
and the extent to which a boundary could exist as an impediment or a conduit to
interaction, occupies a central place (see Mackay, 1958; House, 1981; Klemencic
and Bufon, 1991). Growing international mobility and deepening political-
economic integration during the latter part of the twentieth century have kept this
concern firmly on the agenda of applied border studies. Moreover, as the ‘state
container’ has begun to leak, political-geographical theorization of the role and
nature of borders has diversified rapidly. With increasing pressures on states’
territorial integrity, several geopolitical certainties have been called into question.
The constructionist strand of border research, challenging the traditional state-
centred view of the geopolitical world, has dealt with issues such as how states
and boundaries are involved in the construction of national identities, how
political communities are constituted, and what new political spaces may emerge
in international borderlands.
‘LEAKING CONTAINERS’ MAKE INTERESTING BOUNDARIES
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Recent decades have witnessed several major geopolitical changes, including the
breakdown of the bipolar geopolitical order known as the Cold War, growing neo-
liberalism and economic globalization, attempts at global governance of major
environmental issues, the European integration process, and the emerging free
trade areas around the world. Consequently, new geopolitical scales have emerged
as important arenas alongside the traditional nation-state scale. The regional and
international political spaces and new political power constellations have gained
visibility also in political geography research.
 The new kinds of political spaces and communities emerging in all
continents would have been unthinkable some decades ago. In Peter Taylor’s
(1994) terms, states may have been the prime containers of power, wealth and
culture in the modern world order, but it is clear that these containers have begun
to  leak  in  various  ways.  Depending  on  the  political-economic  context,  different
economic and political arrangements have been set up to deal with local, regional
and national development issues shared across international boundaries. In East
Asia the development of cross-border governance is mostly driven by concerns
with securing favorable conditions for capital accumulation and economic growth.
For example, in the ‘Greater China’ region, multiple networks and foreign direct
investments, crossing the private/public and local/provincial/central domains of
regulation, have regionalized the economies of Hong Kong, southern China and
Taiwan (Sum, 2002).
 China is also part of a ‘Japan Sea regionalism’, together with Russia,
Mongolia, South Korea, North Korea and Japan. This cross-border co-operation
has emerged mainly between subnational authorities, thus avoiding many difficult
issues that have stalled governmental relations between these countries. The
process is largely about sub-national diplomacy with a focus on various
agreements, conferences and linkages between authorities, thus lacking the
economic dynamism of ‘Greater China’ development (Arase, 2002). Nevertheless,
it is part of the post-Cold War deterritorialization and re-bordering that brings
actors together across state boundaries forming new regional alliances and
networks.
 Also in North America, cross-border regionalization is largely driven by
economic concerns instead of a common sense of destiny. The North American
Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is an agreement between Canada, the United States
and Mexico regulating cross-border economic interaction between the countries.
According to Scott (2002), NAFTA represents limited integration that recognizes
interdependence between the local and national economies without compromising
state sovereignty. Again, on the more local scale, cross-border co-operation takes
on forms that avoid some complexities that characterize the co-operation between
national governments (illegal immigration issues, the question of economic
asymmetries, etc.). For example, the Arizona–Sonora region at the US–Mexico
border presents numerous cross-border co-operation schemes involving public,
private and state actors and emphasizing economic, environmental and cultural
issues. As a result, a multi-scalar field of cross-border governance has emerged at
the US–Mexico border for solving local problems that transcend national
boundaries (Scott, 2002).
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 From the European perspective, boundary issues with northern Africa are
dominated by attempts to stall illegal immigration to ‘Fortress Europe’. In contrast
to the tendency towards more relaxed border policies inside the European Union,
the relationships between the EU and African countries reflect mutual suspicion
and tightening border control. For example, Spain and Morocco have unresolved
border issues related to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, which are Spanish
territories in northern Morocco. From the Spanish perspective the question is
mainly  about  stalling  the  flows  of  illegal  immigration  and  drugs  into  the  EU,
whereas the Moroccan perspective focuses on annexing the cities, which would
mark the end of the Spanish colonial domination (Nogué and Villanova, 1999).
 In southern Africa, more endogenous cross-border regionalization
processes have emerged bringing together actors with partly overlapping and
competing interests, goals and identities. For example, Lundin and Söderbaum
(2002) have studied the Maputo Development Corridor, which runs from the
Republic of South Africa to Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe.
The corridor has a long history rooted in migration flows and the concomitant
cultural and economic patterns in the region. A project in the making, like most
cross-border regions, the Maputo corridor is expected to give a boost to
development and economic growth in the region. As one of the best-known
African cross-border projects it is showing the way to others, such as the Caprivi
Strip and Zambezi River projects (Lundin and Söderbaum, 2002).
 An astonishing contextual variety among borderlands and cross-border
regionalization processes is the matter of fact even in Europe where decades of
peaceful and deep-going integration have made many state boundaries practically
non-existent. European integration and the expansion of the European Union since
the 1950s have clearly been the most significant developments influencing
European boundaries and borderlands. While the integration process has certainly
been driven by concern with economic performance in the ‘old continent’, the
European Union is also a post-second World War peace project and, moreover, an
experimentation with the idea of multi-layered citizenships and cultural identities
that  allow local  and  transnational  ties  to  bundle  and  overcome Europe’s  ‘all  too
territorial past’ (Kramsch and Hooper, 2004).
 Yet, even in the laboratory of post-national integration that the European
continent is, or aspires to be, some borders are disappearing but others are being
erected. Newman and Paasi (1998) point out that the breakdown of the Soviet
Union alone created more than twenty new state boundaries. Some state
boundaries  from  the  eastern  side  of  the  former  Iron  Curtain  are  now  within  the
expanded European Union. Many of these borderland contexts lack the longer
history of co-operation that characterizes cross-border regions in the more
traditional European core. Hence, ‘Euroregions’, which are the most
institutionalized forms of cross-border cooperation, differ from each other greatly
between East-Central and Western Europe.
 For example, the Euroregion called Nysa, in the borderland between
Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany, suffers from cross-border economic,
political and cultural discrepancies that are absent in the Dutch–Belgian–German
borderland. There, the Euroregion called Meuse–Rhine has functioned since the
mid-1970s (Kepka and Murphy, 2002). The most significant differences between
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the two Euroregions are related to conditions for economic development, which
are relatively even in Meuse-Rhine, but characterized by stark asymmetry across
the border in Nysa. Also cultural differences and the lack of trust in political
institutions on the ‘other side’ hinder the development of a coherent ‘Euroregion’
governance concept in the Polish–Czech–German borderland.
 The above-mentioned ‘leaks’ in state containers have not gone unnoticed
among scholars interested in globalization and trans-boundary flows. Such
deterritorializing and re-bordering processes are ones generally recognized by
scholars as revealing examples of the current reconfiguration of economic and
governmental space, with significant influences on the nature and role of
international boundaries. However, it is important to realize that borderlands, as
well as cross-border regionalization processes across the globe, are extremely
diverse, and that what the regions have in common may be much less than how
they differ from case to case. Certainly, numerous boundaries are becoming more
and more permeable, and new political spaces, with unforeseen social and
economic functions, are emerging at international boundaries. However, it is
equally true that borderlands exist where none of these developments can be
found, even ones where violence rather than co-operation is commonplace every
day. The ‘peace line’ currently being erected by the Israeli government serves as a
useful reminder of the fact that borders are not developing unilinearly, and that
any assessment of the political geography of borderlands needs to put the studied
processes into their social and historical contexts.
BOUNDARIES AND PLACE: CONTEXT MAKES A DIFFERENCE
Several authors have sought to typologize borderlands and re-bordering processes
so as to sort out the contextual variety and provide guidelines for analysis. For
example, Perkmann and Sum (2002) take local border regimes and central state
intervention as their starting point in distinguishing between different kinds of
cross-border regions. They end up with two main types. The first is characterized
by the continuing erosion of border barriers and little central state intervention, as
exemplified by European cross-border regions between adjoining EU member
states.  In  such  cases  the  emerging  cross-border  region  is  mainly  a  local  and
regional enterprise circumventing, sometimes even opposing, central state control.
In the second type of cross-border regionalization, borders are opened only
selectively  to  allow certain  transactions  while  blocking  others.  This  is  typical  of
cases where concern with economic growth is the driving force behind region-
building.  For  example,  in  some North  American  and  East  Asian  borderlands  the
central state has intervened strongly in setting up special economic zones to boost
cross-border trade, while maintaining or even tightening control over concomitant
immigration flows (Perkmann and Sum, 2002).
 Kramsch and Hooper (2004) have created a more historically and culturally
based typology of border regimes. They distinguish between regimes emerging in
functionally integrated cross-border regions with little or no border controls and
those emerging in the post-Cold War buffer zone borderlands with fewer
advantages. The third type they identify is regimes at the edge of Empire, defining
and protecting its political, cultural and economic order. The first type is best
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exemplified by re-bordering processes in the ‘Schengenlandia’ of Western Europe
– what Häkli and Kaplan (2002) call ‘Established Europe’ in their own typology.
The second type can be found in a diversity of settings, but in the European
context it clearly refers to the EU accession countries of Central and Eastern
Europe – the ‘Emerging Europe’ (Häkli and Kaplan, 2002). The last type refers to
buffer zones between world economic cores and peripheries, borderlands that
serve to institutionalize political, economic and cultural asymmetries forming the
basis of a world order. While often relatively peaceful, these zones reflect political
and cultural tensions rooted in ‘older colonial endeavours’ (Kramsch and Hooper,
2004).
 Other typologies have been made with differing starting points and
analytical goals (see, e.g., Bucken-Knapp and Schack, 2001). However, it is clear
that these cannot exhaust the cultural, historical and geographical varieties that
differentiate borderland contexts. Each borderland is unique in some respects, and
if we are to avoid reductionist explanation of current re-bordering processes, this
contextuality should be taken seriously. At the same time, it is clear that a level of
abstraction is absolutely necessary for making sense of this vast societal
transformation. Too much emphasis on the particular and unique leads to
descriptive accounts that do not further general understanding of how the
relationship between politics and space is changing (Bucken-Knapp and Schack,
2001).
 Rather than seek similarities among different borderlands, it may, therefore,
be more useful to focus on themes that cut across the multidisciplinary literature
on boundaries and link the research area with the broader specter of social theory.
Themes that are especially pertinent to political geography are the question of
scales, the nature of trans-boundary political spaces, and the role of collective
identities in re-bordering processes (see, e.g., Newman and Paasi, 1998;
Perkmann and Sum, 2002; Anderson et al., 2003; Kramsch and Hooper, 2004).
BORDERLANDS AS NESTED SCALES
The idea of scale as a factor influencing human interactions has been a major
theme in the human geography of the past decades. Until roughly the mid-1980s,
scale was typically seen as an empirical variable, either as distance influencing the
studied phenomena, or as an object of study defined by the given administrative
divisions  of  space  ranging  from  the  local  to  the  regional,  national  and
international.  Often  the  local  scale  would  simply  mean  city  or  municipality,  the
regional scale consisting of several municipalities. The national scale was seen as
composed  of  sub-national  regions,  and  the  international  scale  as  a  bundle  of
national territories.
 This perspective is still dominant in the policy-orientated research fostered
by local, regional and European organizations (Donnan and Wilson, 1999). Here
the influences and meanings of scale are understood as arising from the divisions
of administrative power and political authority of the target areas and their
national contexts. In research looking at economic interactions across boundaries,
the border is typically interpreted as a barrier, and the influences of scale are
assessed in terms of metric or relative physical distance (van Houtum, 1999).
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 Since the mid-1980s, this taken-for-granted conception of spatial scales has
been criticized particularly in analyses of the political economy of globalization
and the social construction of space (Marston, 2000; Brenner, 2001). This
growing  literature  has  worked  to  discard  both  the  naïve  conception  of  scales  as
pre-given spatial levels, and the view that scales can be reduced to various aspects
of physical distance. Instead, the social processes of scale construction have been
scrutinized, and more particularly the ways in which scales are actually set or
fixed amidst the flux of social interaction (e.g.Taylor, 1982; Jonas, 1994; Smith,
1995; Jones, 1998).
Unsurprisingly, scale has long figured also in the context of research on
borders and borderlands. Authors such as John House (1981), Ivo Duchacek
(1986) and Julian Minghi (1991) have paid attention to the influences of
geographical scale on interactions across state boundaries. In these early works,
scale was mainly understood as an aspect of physical distance, whereas more
recently social constructionist approaches have gained ground. For example, the
construction of scale has been analysed variably as processes of networking where
actors negotiate alliances and bargain for political power (e.g. Cox, 1996, 1998);
as processes of ‘spatial socialization’ where individuals learn to make sense of the
world in the context of various geographical divisions (e.g. Paasi, 1996); and as
the conflicting or harmonious intermingling of spatial identities in borderland
contexts (e.g. Kaplan, 2000). While approaching the issue of scale from very
different viewpoints, these writers have made it clear that qualitative differences
exist between small-scale interactions close to the border and the interactions
between, for example, national actors directed from the capital cities. This
underlines the fact that interactions across national borderlands cannot be reduced
to states’ actions only.
 To understand the social construction of scale in the context of
institutionally driven cross-border interaction, it is necessary to assess the
processes that set or fix geographical scales. Following Smith (1995), we can
argue that geographical scales are produced simultaneously to enable and contain
particular forms of social interaction. For example, the nation-state is one of the
typical scales of modernity, perhaps the most established one. Rather than simply
assuming  the  state’s  territorial  form,  it  may  be  useful  to  pay  attention  to  the
supranational constitution of the nation-state as a hegemonic and sustainable
institutional form (Giddens, 1985). The rigidly bounded nation-states did not
emerge in isolation but as part of an international state system, within which their
boundaries have been systemically negotiated and regulated. From this vantage
point the state can be analysed as a scale that has both contained social interaction
by limiting it within the territorial reach of the state, and enabled social activities
by directing, aligning, and co-ordinating the efforts of a large number of actors
(Taylor, 1996; Häkli, 2001).
 Depending on what functions of the modern state we wish to emphasize, it
is possible to point at particular social infrastructures and networks that have
contributed to the production of the ‘national’ scale. From an economic point of
view, the state has secured the necessary conditions for the accumulation of
capital and, broadly speaking, enabled the competitive co-operation of companies
through the division of labor. From a cultural point of view, the state has enabled
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the concerted construction of national identities, and contained and fostered
cultural forms (language, history, arts) that have been labeled national. From a
social point of view, the state has contained social relations both mentally and
physically within its territorial boundaries through school education and other
mechanisms of national socialization, as well as by regulating the movement of
people across its territorial boundaries (Taylor, 1994; Smith, 1995; Paasi, 1996;
Häkli, 1999).
 Similar processes are at work on other scales of the modern society – the
local,  the  regional  and  the  international.  These  scales  are  often  seen  as
autonomous from each other, implying that the division of power and authority
between the state and the region is something of an original ‘state of
nature’(Häkli, 1998).Yet, having assumed their role as established levels of
authority and interaction, these scales have all emerged interdependently as part of
the territorial governmental order in modern societies (Harvie, 1994; Häkli, 2001).
 This is not to claim that the local, regional and national scales would
essentially be the same because of their shared origin in the history of the modern
governmental order. Here we come to another important implication of the social
constructionist approach to scales, namely their charged character as the products
of political contestation and co-operation. Much of the recent interest in cross-
border regionalization derives precisely from an understanding that the state is
being challenged by these new scalar constructs. Hence, the emerging
transnational political spaces can be conceptualized as scales that help actors to
skirt the traditional state-centred patterns of networking. Transnational scales,
then, are produced and reproduced in processes that set alternative perimeters to
networks of co-operation between actors who seek strategic advantage from this
co-operation (Häkli, 1998). The perimeter can be fluid or fixed, depending on the
spatial frame that actors wish to, or have to, adopt (Smith, 1995; Cox, 1998).
When the networking takes place irrespective of established political-
administrative units, a new scale is being produced.
 Cross-border co-operation typically cuts across various scales ranging from
individual actors to local authorities to regional networks to national governments
to international organizations. In this regard, borderland spaces are actually places
where different scales of action become nested, forming hybrid bundles across the
local, regional, national and international networks. Because of this, it can be
quite difficult to align the interests of each actor. Often the desires of local actors
are contravened by activities of state governments that do not wish to relinquish
their traditional authority. In the European context, Euroregions have sometimes
been caught between the contradictory goals of actors operating at separate spatial
scales. A borderland population may be drawn apart or even ignored by two larger
states that do not appreciate the particular concerns of the residents. For example,
the Catalan population has been divided by differing nationalist agendas in France
and Spain (Häkli, 2002). Similar distinctions have also had a major impact on the
Tyrolean and Slovenian populations along the Italo–Austrian and Italo–Slovene
boundaries (Kaplan, 2000).
 Seen in terms of networking, scales are an integral part of the very
economic, political and social interaction they enable and constrain. Roughly
speaking, the networks of actors co-operate internally and compete externally.
Author’s copy. Originally published in Kevin R. Cox, Murray Low & Jenny Robinson (eds). Handbook of
Political Geography. London: Sage (2008), 471-482.
9
Yet, far from being harmonious and symmetrical, the production and reproduction
of geographical scales remains a contested process. Established scales can
dissolve as a consequence of pressures of economic, cultural or political origin. In
turn, newly constructed scales may fail to reach the level of popular support that
their functioning as broad integrative frameworks necessitates.
 The potential ‘legitimacy deficit’ experienced by institutionally created
cross-border networks is particularly interesting from the perspective of this
chapter. When institutionally based actors fail to gain popular appeal for the
cross-border networks they are constructing, the resulting new scale will not
become an important political reality. At best, it may form a new quasi-
autonomous  layer  of  political  authority  on  top  of  the  more  traditional  ones.  It  is
precisely this development that is being addressed in debates revolving around the
possible erosion of the nation-state, the rise of the region, and the uncertain future
of cross-border governance.
DETERRITORIALIZING AND RE-BORDERING POLITICAL SPACE AT
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
It has become a broadly accepted view among political analysts that the emerging
cross-border political spaces are challenging the state-centred spatiality of politics.
At stake is not only the role of international boundaries as barriers, but also the
very principle defining the modern political space, that is, territorial congruence
between political authority, political rights and belonging to a political community
(Low, 1997). The territorial foundation of politics and rigid state boundaries are
the outcome of the consolidation of state power in the modern period and the
concomitant rise of the international state system (Ruggie, 1993; Murphy, 1996;
Ó Tuathail, 1996). This governmental order is now being challenged, or at least
modified, by processes leading to transnational forms of cross-border governance
(Kramsch and Hooper, 2004).
 Since roughly the late 1980s, political and economic regulation has moved
progressively from state-centred government to governance based on multiple
partnerships across the public/private divide, and bringing together both
governmental and non-governmental organizations. This trend is reflected
empirically in the proliferation of projects directed at local and regional
development across various territorial scales (Jessop, 2002: 43). Among such
projects are the many processes of regionalization, in which new transterritorial
and international mechanisms of governance are created through political and
economic networking (e.g. Delli Zotti, 1996; Perkmann and Sum, 2002).
 Following Bob Jessop (1995), governance can be understood broadly as
attempts to attain collective goals and purposes in and through specific
configurations of governmental and non-governmental institutions, organizations
and practices. Thus, instead of a coherent and ready-made territorial system of
political representation upon which policy-making could be built, we should
expect to find a more fluid, less systematic and highly diversified field of
governance, where regions or trans-regional networks perform very differently
depending on their ability to mobilize and co-ordinate both human and economic
resources for collective goal-attainment (Le Galès, 1998).
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 Probably the most challenging new forms of governance are related to
cross-border regionalization where, ideally, different national political, legislative
and administrative cultures should act together and enable the actors involved to
assess trajectories of development, envision common goals, and determine means
of achieving these (Perkmann, 1999; Scott, 2000). It may be feasible to explain
the general shift from government towards governance with reference to the major
political-economic trends of the past three decades: globalization, supranational
integration, the end of the Cold War, and general rescaling related to the
‘hollowing out of the nation-state’ (Swyngedouw, 1992; O’Dowd andWilson,
1996). However, when assessing the rapid growth of the number of cross-border
regions across the globe since the early 1970s, it is important to realize that this
development also reflects the policies of national governments and transnational
institutions. This is the case particularly in Europe, where the European Union has
launched several programmes fostering cross-border co-operation (e.g. Tacis,
Phare, Interreg).
 The fact that dozens of ‘Euroregions’ or ‘Euregions’ have been established
in European borderlands indicates that institutional stability is much desired as a
support for cross-border governance. Euroregions are commonly seen as avenues
for better access to the European Commission and EU funding (Perkmann, 2002).
For individual authorities, participation may offer the chance to be prepared in
terms of an established partnership, as commonly required by the European
Regional Development Fund initiatives and programmes. Furthermore, precisely
because it opens direct connections between local and regional authorities and the
European Union, Euroregions provide the former with more elbow room in
negotiations with their own national governments in issues of regional
development, decision-making and representation of interests. Not surprisingly,
Euroregions seem to have obtained a permanent place in the contemporary ‘multi-
level governance’ in Europe (Ward and Williams, 1997; Perkmann and Sum,
2002).
 Cross-border regionalization in Europe and elsewhere is part of a
development  that  will  bring  about  a  more  polycentric  world.  States  as  well  as
subnational and transnational organizations have launched policies that actively
foster regional co-operation across national boundaries. Numerous economic,
political and cultural actors involved in cross-border co-operation have seized
these opportunities in an attempt to expand their capacity to govern (Häkli, 1998;
Perkmann and Sum, 2002). Nevertheless, the reorganization of European political
space is politically and culturally a highly contentious project. New power
alliances have emerged within the private sector and across the private/public
divide challenging the traditional divisions of political authority, as well as the
systems of political representation that legitimate these divisions (Benz, 1998).
 To the degree that emerging cross-border networks are, in fact, producing
new political spaces and scales of social action at international borders, we may
argue that deterritorialization is an ongoing process changing the nature of
modern state-centred political space. However, the success of this development
depends not only on the number of institutionally created networks and projects.
To gain deeper understanding of the political significance of these processes, it is
necessary to look at the degree to which these re-bordered transnational political
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spaces have been institutionalized in the popular realm of political thought and
action.
 To  focus  on  the  everyday  perceptions  of  people  may  at  first  seem  an
unnecessary complication in the analysis of contemporary political change.
However, it can be argued that in the long run the success of major political
innovations will depend on their appeal among the ‘ordinary people’. In this
respect, the way in which people perceive the transnational political spaces,
within which they live every day, may be of decisive importance when it comes to
their potential as new political spaces, forms of constituency and transnational
community.
 The fact that cross-border regionalization is in most cases led by politicians,
authorities and other professionals is not without consequences. Cross-border
regions are far from being regions in the conventional juridico-political sense, that
is, they are not governed through territorially based popular representation
(Perkmann and Sum, 2002). Instead they often involve irregular and partial modes
of governance that operate in a network-like manner (Kramsch and Hooper,
2004). These networks of governance bring together individual and collective
actors who can contribute to, and have something at stake in, the process. In most
cases what is lacking is a representative mechanism that would link the broader
population to governance institutions or networks.
 Hence, for example, in Europe the ‘Euroregions’, or ‘Euregions’, which
now number more than seventy, have remained technocratic entities detached
from people’s everyday concerns (Perkmann, 2002: 121). Also in East Asia and
North  America,  networks  of  governance  have  typically  emerged  in  the  spirit  of
competitive co-operation, reflecting mutual interests in economic growth across
the boundary, or they have been set up to exploit opportunities for funding by
national governments and transnational institutions. With a focus on aspects that
mainly concern professional elites, the emerging forms of cross-border
governance may represent a less radical development than they at first seem.
 Moreover, to reach the minds and hearts of ‘ordinary people’, cross-border
governance should gain political legitimacy based on popular acceptance of the
new geo-economic relations, authorities, participatory possibilities and belonging
to transnational regions. This calls for an acknowledgeable citizenry aware of new
emerging transnational linkages and institutions for governance, and willing to
participate in their activities to the degree that is possible. Needless to say,
perhaps, these conditions are as yet rarely met among the people living at, or near,
international borders.
NEW POLITICAL SPACES, OLD CULTURAL IDENTITIES?
Identity was one of the most used and least theorized catchwords of the cultural
studies literature of the 1990s (Häkli and Paasi, 2003). It is still frequently used in
attempts to understand the multilayered and sometimes overlapping feelings of
community and belonging in various social and spatial groups. While identity is a
useful concept for discussing spatial group formation, it should be kept in mind
that the word in itself explains little (Hall, 1996). Rather, the concept of identity
can be seen as a constituent part of the very discourses that form political
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communities. Spatial concepts, such as place, region and territory, as well as the
images of shared and divided space that these concepts denote, play a central role
in identity discourses shaping the geopolitical world.
 In fact, political-geographical research on nationalism has shown that
territory is more important an element in the construction of national identities
than theories of nationalism have generally acknowledged (e.g. Nogué, 1991;
Hooson, 1994; Herb and Kaplan, 1999). Joan Nogué (1998) has distinguished at
least seven dimensions through which territory may acquire significance in the
construction of national identities. These include cartographic representation,
education in geography, the definition of national boundaries, internal regional
divisions, ideological landscapes, the idea of national character, and the protection
of nature. Moreover, both the textual and physical landscapes should be taken into
account in the analysis of nationalism (Duncan, 1990; Graham, 1998; Häkli,
1999).
 The relationship between national boundaries and the construction of
territorial identities has rightly become one of the most intensively studied
theoretical questions in the area of border studies. This interest has resulted in a
broad understanding of the role of boundaries as constituents of collective
identities, with emphasis on the formation of identities as the accentuation of the
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, through the social construction of boundaries
(Sahlins, 1989; Donnan and Wilson, 1994; Pettman, 1996). Needless to say, this
strand of research accords with epistemologies that stress the anti-essential
character of all social institutions independently of their possible material
ramifications.  Such  an  analysis  of  boundaries  does  not  ignore  the  reality  of  the
border as a physical delimiter of state territory, but serves as an important
reminder of the way in which space and power, or the spatial and social realities,
are inseparably connected (Paasi, 1996).
 The social construction and spatial rootedness of territorial identities is
particularly consequential from the point of view of the emerging transnational
political spaces. At a general level, cross-border governance as a social practice is
certainly creating its own political spaces that deviate from the traditional
international state system. Instead of being discrete entities of the external social,
economic and political reality, the transnational regions are constructs that are
created and reproduced in social practices, such as those involved in governance
(e.g. Häkli, 1998; Jessop, 2002). Hence, governance is not only a set of practices
played  out  in  a  particular  regional  setting,  but  it  is  also  constitutive  of  ‘the
regional’ as a field of action and knowledge.
 This is most apparent in the case of transnational regions that are of
relatively  recent  origin  and  have  emerged  as  more  or  less  loose  concepts  in  the
context of cross-border co-operation. These regional formations are typically
transnational networks bringing together governmental, economic and cultural
elites with at least partly overlapping interests and visions (Le Galès, 1998; Smith,
1998). Moreover, as Manuel Castells (1997) points out, the actors who are
engaged in new kinds of social networks and projects tend to identify with the
realities they are constructing. Thus, cross-border governance gives rise to
‘project identities’ shared by the participating professionals (Castells, 1997: 8).
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 However, while the actors who are involved in trans-boundary networks
may indeed identify with the emerging transnational political space, this is not
always the case with the broader population characterized by its more traditional
state-centred loyalties. Professional discourses portray national boundaries
typically as barriers to be bridged, as elements that unify rather than separate the
adjacent regions. Yet those who know little about official trans-boundary
initiatives keep negotiating their spatial identities as embedded in their everyday
practices. Consequently, a rather traditional understanding of territorial political
space dominates the contexts in which people form their political views and frame
policy issues.
 To understand why this is the case, we may again turn to Castells (1997:
66), who argues that in providing the population with citizenship rights the states
have also created ‘legitimizing identities’. The increasingly powerful and
interventionist state government has produced and reproduced national identities
to rationalize its domination. These identities still hold strong despite the
intensifying transnational integration and globalization. People have not
surrendered their traditional loyalties because the state has remained the primary
provider of their citizenship rights (Dijkink, 1996; Hirst, 1997).
 The growing legal and illegal immigration has increased cultural contacts
across state boundaries, but also created tensions that are rooted in the traditional
nation-state identities. The distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes highly
consequential when the immigrant population is seen to present a threat to what is
defined as a self-sustaining national culture (Mains, 2000). In such cases, the
situation  may  culminate  in  racist  discourses  and  actions  by  citizens  who  do  not
tolerate the growing number of immigrants in their territory. A good example is
the ‘Minutemen Project’, a movement that brought hundreds of civilian volunteers
to patrol the US–Mexican border in Arizona (Jordan, 2005). Intent on halting the
flow of illegal immigration from the South, the movement actually worked to re-
border space that for decades has progressively transnationalized both in
economic and cultural terms (Soguk, 1996).
 All in all, the social and cultural inertia embedded in people’s connection
with territory, the sense of place, may be a more powerful intervening force in the
development of transnational political space than the practitioners of cross-border
governance may have expected. The era of strong nation-states left a legacy of
statist loyalties at international frontiers and this should not be underestimated in
the analysis of transnational political space (Donnan and Wilson, 1999; Häkli,
2001; Häkli and Kaplan, 2002; Sidaway, 2002; Strüver, 2004). The shift toward
functionally more porous borders has not met with equal erosion of the boundaries
in people’s minds and hearts. While the roles of state boundaries have changed,
the  border  as  a  social construct prevails in various social practices and cultural
processes of identification.
 An obvious conclusion is that the processes of cross-border co-operation
have worked to disconnect the politics of governance from national territories and
democratic participation. Because they are elite-driven, these re-bordering
processes can hardly yield platforms for shared political and cultural identity
across national boundaries. Problems are found even in places like the Catalan
and Basque borderlands where governance is favored by linguistic affinity across
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the border (Raento, 2002; Häkli, 2004).Territorial congruence between political,
cultural and economic processes can not easily be achieved in transnational
political spaces. We can therefore anticipate that in securing political participation
the role of governance is at best complementary to state-based governmental
practice. As yet, it seems that cross-border governance is more about political and
economic elites governing people, rather than the people governing themselves.
 The complexities of identification at international borderlands might easily
be dismissed as a passing phase on our way towards an integrated world.
However, it is unlikely that the discrepancy between professional and popular
identifications will be over any time soon (Appadurai, 1996; Dijkink, 1996;
Wilson and Donnan, 1998). The social and cultural inertia embedded in people’s
connection with territory, the sense of place, is a much more powerful intervening
force than may have been expected. Moreover, as it is unlikely that transnational
identities will soon emerge replacing traditional territorial identities, it is safe to
argue that the connection between political participation and national territory will
persist. Instead of merely appreciating the fact, we should seek to analyse its roots
and consequences, carefully balancing generalization and sensitivity to local
contextuality.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has addressed three major aspects in re-bordering political space, all
of which pertain to the changing relationship between space and power. First, the
role and significance of scale was assessed in the context of various processes
crossing international boundaries. Second, the construction of transnational
regions as new political scales at international borderlands was dealt with. Third,
the institutionalization of these regions was discussed with particular attention to
the issue of political legitimacy as related to professional and popular
identifications with the emerging political spaces. Because of the rapid growth of
cross-border regions all over the world, there is a growing demand for knowledge
about the forms of, and degrees of, popular attachment to transnational political
spaces.
 The chapter argues that not only is scale a useful tool in thinking about
border regions, but that its significance varies according to the viewpoints of
differently  placed  observers.  Instead  of  striving  for  a  general  theory  of  scales  or
borderlands, the approach argued for here acknowledges the tensions between
different  understandings  and  perceptions  of  cross-border  interaction  that  arise
from different realms of social action. Moreover, the significance of scale as a
factor in the development of borderlands extends beyond differences between
local and national perspectives. For a deeper understanding of the current
transitions and fixities in international borderlands, it is important to explore the
differences between scale as a factor in people’s everyday life, and scale as a
factor influencing cross-border co-operation between institutional actors.
 The former perspective is well captured by the term increasingly used
within border studies to denote people who live near state borders: the
‘borderlanders’ (e.g. Wilson and Donnan, 1998). The borderlander concept points
at the role of state boundaries as a significant element in the daily environment of
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the people living in the vicinity. It also signals the fact that cross-border
interactions are more likely to occur when the ‘other side’ is easily accessible, in
contrast to people living further away from the border.
 Numerous forms of co-operation exist across the national boundaries,
giving rise to multiple, more or less institutionalized settings for governance based
on complex trans-boundary networks. Politicians and economic actors all around
the world have been willing to seize opportunities to form new regional alliances,
to utilize the funding provided by national and transnational governments, and to
enhance their capacities through strategic networking.
 However, while cross-border co-operation is characterized mainly by
technocratic goals, any ‘bridge-building’ across international boundaries remains
politically tension-laden. Differences persist because the development of the
transnational regions is conditioned by the social and geographical contexts of
trans-boundary co-operation. Moreover, there is as yet little popular awareness of
institutional activities that are fostering cross-border regionalization. This is an
issue that will greatly influence the actual outcomes and the political potential of
cross-border governance.
 All in all, in the light of many studies of borderland identities (O’Dowd and
Wilson, 1996; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Wilson and Donnan, 1998), it seems that
the existence of networks for cross-border co-operation will not necessarily lead
to the rapid erosion of political and cultural identities connected to the history of
the modern nation-state. They may simply add new layers or dimensions to
territorial governance, which, depending on the social, cultural and economic
context, may or may not function as an important political arena. This is because
networking tends to follow its own functional and institutional logic, which
typically remains unconnected to people’s everyday concerns. The fact that people
living at international borderlands are typically unaware of how cross-border
projects operate, or how to participate in the politics of regionalization across the
national boundary, lends little support to the idea of an increasing awareness of
shared political goals pertaining to re-bordered transnational spaces.
 What  can  be  safely  concluded  is  that  while  the  political  spaces  are
definitely going through multiple changes, these are experienced differently in
different borderlands. Even though it is more and more easy to cross many
international boundaries, the image of borders as natural dividers between
national cultures persists. Studies on boundaries and identities have convincingly
shown that state borders are essential for the establishment and negotiation of
national identities. Therefore, in Michael Billig’s (1995: 60) terms, to remove an
international boundary altogether would require the dissolution of the forms of
life that produce and reproduce national cultures, societies and polities. Despite
the many cross-border networks functioning across the globe, this is not likely to
happen soon.
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